Matching And Efficiency In The Baseball Free-Agent System: An Experimental Examination
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- Nalbantian, Haig R & Schotter, Andrew, 1995. "Matching and Efficiency in the Baseball Free-Agent System: An Experimental Examination," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-31, January.
References listed on IDEAS
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Keywords
empirical methods ; resource allocation;Statistics
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