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Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets

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  • Robin S. Lee
  • Michael Schwarz

Abstract

We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes the one-to-one matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962) by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition. Agents may learn preferences over partners via costly interviews. Although there exist multiple equilibria where all agents receive the same number of interviews, efficiency depends on overlap -- the number of common interview partners among agents. We prove the equilibria with the highest degree of overlap yields the highest probability of being matched. The analysis suggests that institutions which ration interviews or create labor market segmentation may lead to greater efficiency in information acquisition activities.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 14922.

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Date of creation: Apr 2009
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14922

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  4. Hoppe, Heidrun C. & Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2006. "The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
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  8. Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2006. "A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 233-273, June.
  9. Jens Josephson & Joel Shapiro, 2008. "Interviews and Adverse Selection," Working Papers 349, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  10. Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2000. "Networks versus Vertical Integration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(3), pages 570-601, Autumn.
  11. Guillaume Haeringer & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Decentralised Job Matching," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2003.114, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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  14. Mongell, Susan & Roth, Alvin E, 1991. "Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 441-64, June.
  15. Paul Schweinzer, 2008. "Labour market recruiting with intermediaries," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 119-127, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Itay P. Fainmesser, 2012. "Community Structure and Market Outcomes: A Repeated Games-in-Networks Approach," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 32-69, February.
  2. Chhabra, Meenal & Das, Sanmay & Sarne, David, 2014. "Expert-mediated sequential search," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 861-873.
  3. Peter Coles & Ran Shorrer, 2013. "Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2013.49, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  4. Siegel, Ron & Ely, Jeffrey C., 2013. "Adverse selection and unraveling in common-value labor markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.

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