This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Envy-Minimizing Unemployment Benefits

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Arnsperger, Christian (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Chaire Hoover)
de la Croix, David (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) ; Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS))

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper offers an analysis of the optimality of unemployment benefits based on the concept of no-envy. Using a general equilibrium framework whit uncertainty, we derive the conditions for a trade-off between the intensity of envy and the expected percentage of envious persons. If the governmentÕs aversion for the intensity of envy is not too strong (alongside conditions on householdsÕ utilities), the optimal benefit is positive and below the full insurance level. We also show that, for a low enough aversion for the intensity of envy, the optimal replacement ratio decreases with unfavorable changes in the distribution of the technological shock.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number 1995001.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 21
Date of creation: 01 Dec 1994
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1995001

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Fax: +32 10473945
Email:
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/econ
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Anne DAVISTER).

Related research
Keywords: envy; unemployment benefits; fairness; employment;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1975. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," Discussion Papers 174, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Wadsworth, Jonathan, 1991. "Unemployment Benefits and Search Effort in the UK Labour Market," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(229), pages 17-34, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Baily, Martin Neil, 1978. "Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 379-402, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Phipps, Shelley, 1991. "Equity and Efficiency Consequences of Unemployment Insurance Reform in Canada: The Importance of Sensitivity Analyses," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(230), pages 199-214, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Atkinson, Anthony B & Micklewright, John, 1991. "Unemployment Compensation and Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 29(4), pages 1679-1727, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Social choice," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 31, pages 1091-1125 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Easley, David & Kiefer, Nicholas M & Possen, Uri, 1985. "An Equilibrium Analysis of Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Taxation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(5), pages 989-1010, Supp.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Azariadis, Costas & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1983. "Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 1-22, Supplemen.
  10. Lindbeck, A. & Molander, P. & Persson, T. & Paterson, O. & Sandmo, A. & Swedenborg, B. & Thygesen, N., 1993. "Options for Economic and Political Reform in Sweden," Papers 540, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  11. Nicolas Marceau & Robin Boadway, 1991. "The Redistributive Role of Minimum Wage Legislation and Unemployment Insurance," Working Papers 805, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  12. Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Brown, Murray & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1988. " Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 90(4), pages 529-47.
  14. Diamantaras, Dimitrios & Thomson, William, 1990. "A refinement and extension of the no-envy concept," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 217-222, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Feldman, Allan M & Kirman, Alan, 1974. "Fairness and Envy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 995-1005, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes books.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.