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Learning by Fund-raising

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  • Alvaro Jose Name

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    Abstract

    From experience, fund-raisers learn to become more efficient solicitors. This paper incorporates fund-raising technology into the theory of charitable giving. A full characterization of the solicitation strategy that maximizes donations net of fund-raising costs is provided. The strategy identi.es a fundraiser incentive to invest in learning by soliciting some early donors who would give less than their solicitation costs. A notion of “excessive” fund-raising is introduced. It is shown that this may worsen with learning. Our model also accomodates a technology with overhead costs. An extension with rising solicitation costs is also considered.

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    File URL: http://e-archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/18862/we1408.pdf?sequence=1
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we1408.

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    Date of creation: May 2014
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    Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we1408

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    Keywords: fund-raising; solicitation cost; charitable giving;

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