Some stock exchanges, such as the Spanish Stock Exchange and Euronext (Paris), allow traders to place orders in a ‘pre-opening’ period. Orders placed in this period are used to determine the opening price, and can be cancelled at any moment and at no cost by the traders. We consider a model in which noise traders can appear in the market before or after the opening, and a strategic informed trader decides her order strategy at the pre-opening and at the opening period. We characterize the equilibrium of such a model, showing that at the pre-opening there is a non-monotonic relation between the aggregate quantity ordered and prices. Thus, the equilibrium at the pre-opening stage is determined in a way which is fundamentally different from the equilibrium in the open market. We proceed to study the implications of the existence of a pre-opening period on information revelation and on the determination of the opening price. We present evidence from the Spanish Stock Exchange that seem to support the theoretical predictions, showing a clear different in behaviour between the market behaviour before and after the opening of the market.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa in its series Business Economics Working Papers with number
wb035814.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: