This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Entrepreneurship, Asymmetric Information and Unemployment

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Robin Boadway () (Department of Economics, Queen's University)
Nicolas Marceau () (Center for Research on Economic Fluctuations and Employment, UQAM)
Maurice Marchand () (IAG, Universite Catholique de Louvain, and CORE)
Marianne Vigneault () (Department of Economics, Bishop's University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We examine how three sources of asymmetric information affect the supply of entrepreneurs and unemployment. In the first case, banks cannot observe entrepreneurs' risk of failure so ration credit. This increases the number of entrepreneurs and the level of unemployment. In the second case, firms cannot observe workers' effort so offer a wage above the market clearing one. This results in unemployment and too few entrepreneurs. The final case arises when firms cannot observe workers' abilities. A pooling wage is offered and results in too many entrepreneurs. The role of government in restoring efficiency is explored

Dans ce texte, nous étudions l'impact de trois formes d'asymétrie d'information sur l'entrepreneurship et le chômage. Dans le premier cas, les banques ne peuvent observer la probabilité qu'un entrepreneur fasse faillite, ce qui les conduit à restreindre l'accès au crédit. Cela cause un accroissement du nombre d'entrepreneurs et du chômage. Dans un deuxième cas, les firmes ne peuvent observer l'effort de leurs travailleurs et offrent alors un salaire d'efficience. D'un tel salaire résulte du chômage et un trop petit nombre d'entrepreneurs. Dans le dernier cas, les firmes ne peuvent observer l'habileté de leurs travailleurs. Un même salaire est alors offert à tous les travailleurs, ce qui conduit à un trop grand npmbre d'entrepreneurs. Nous étudions les formes d'intervention gouvernementale permettant d'accroître l'efficacité.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.unites.uqam.ca/eco/CREFE/cahiers/cah57.ps
File Format: application/postscript
File Function: Main text
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://www.unites.uqam.ca/eco/CREFE/cahiers/cah57.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Main text
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal in its series Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers with number 57.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Jan 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cre:crefwp:57

Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 8888, Downtown Station, Montreal (Canada) Quebec, H3C 3P8
Phone: (514) 987-6181
Fax: (514) 987-8494
Email:
Web page: http://ideas.uqam.ca/CREFE/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Stéphane Pallage).

Related research
Keywords: entrepreneurship; unemployment; occupational choice;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies
M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Aghion, Philippe & Howitt, Peter, 1994. "Growth and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(3), pages 477-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Pestieau, Pierre, 1991. "Optimal linear income taxation in models with occupational choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 133-162, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987. "Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 167-182, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Kihlstrom, Richard E & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1979. "A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(4), pages 719-48, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Marc Cowling & Mark Taylor & Peter Mitchell, 2004. "Job Creators," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 72(5), pages 601-617, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Mirjam van Praag & Gerrit de Wit & Niels Bosma, 2003. "Initial Capital Constraints hinder Entrepreneurial Venture Performance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-047/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 19 Nov 2004. [Downloadable!]
  2. Oana Secrieru & Marianne Vigneault, 2004. "Public Venture Capital and Entrepreneurship," Working Papers 04-10, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  3. Mikko Leppaemaeki & Vesa Kanniainen, 2000. "Entrepreneurship in a Unionised Economy," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Pekka Ilmakunnas & Vesa Kanniainen & Uki Lammi, . "Entrepreneurship, Economic Risks, and Risk-Insurance in the Welfare State," EPRU Working Paper Series 99-03, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Robin Boadway & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2003. "Public Economics and Startup Entrepreneurs," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Mirjam van Praag, 2003. "Initial Capital Constraints Hinder Entrepreneurial Venture Performance: An empirical analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  7. Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Bo Nielsen, 2000. "Tax Policy, Venture Capital, and Entrepreneurship," NBER Working Papers 7976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over 80% of the top 1000 economists are registered on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-6.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.