Assassinations are a persistent feature of the political landscape. Using a new data set of assassination attempts on all world leaders from 1875 to 2004, we exploit inherent randomness in the success or failure of assassination attempts to identify assassination’s effects. We find that, on average, successful assassinations of autocrats produce sustained moves toward democracy. We also find that assassinations affect the intensity of small-scale conflicts. The results document a contemporary source of institutional change, inform theories of conflict, and show that small sources of randomness can have a pronounced effect on history.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances F52 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James Robinson & Pierre Yared, 2005.
"Income and Democracy,"
NBER Working Papers
11205, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A & Yared, Pierre, 2005.
"Income and Democracy,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5273, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson & Pierre Yared, 2008.
"Income and Democracy,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 808-42, June.
[Downloadable!]
Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2002.
"Legal Origins,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1193-1229, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001.
"Legal Origins,"
NBER Working Papers
8272, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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