This Paper presents a model in which boundedly rational members of an administrative staff calculate resource allocations in real time. We consider a class of hierarchical procedures in which information about payoff functions flows up and is aggregated by a hierarchy, while allocations flow down and are disaggregated by the hierarchy with decentralized decision making. We assume that the payoff functions are quadratic and that the payoff parameters follow first-order autoregressive processes. We define a team statistical optimality condition that formalizes the notion of decentralized decision making. We derive a reduced form that can be used to address specific questions about organizational structure and returns to scale.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
4022.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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