GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. (UniversitŽ catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)) GARCIA, Filomena PAIS, Joana RESENDE, Joana (UniversitŽ catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
In this note, we start to claim that established marriages can be heavily destabilized when the population of existing couples is enriched by the arrival of new candidates to marriage. Afterwards, we discuss briefly how stability concepts can be extended to account for entry and exit phenomena affecting the composition of the marriage market.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number
2008067.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: