Understanding Ransom Kidnapping and Its Duration
AbstractWhat factors drive the length of a kidnapping experience? A theoretical model is developed to conduct comparative statics. A unique data set covering all kidnappings for ransom in Sardinia between 1960 and 2010 is analyzed. Factors related to the ability to pay and cost of abduction matter. The effect of policies aimed at deterring the crime have mixed effects on its duration.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia in its series Working Paper CRENoS with number 201219.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
kidnapping; ransom; sardinia; survival analysis; crime;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-08-23 (All new papers)
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