A cliometric analysis of the Aldo Moro kidnapping and assassination
AbstractIn Rome, on 16 March 1978, the Red Brigades kidnapped Aldo Moro. They kept him a prisoner for 55 days, and ultimately killed him. Why did they decide to kill Moro since it appears a posteriori that they did not improve their situation by doing so? Our paper answers this question by building mainly on the model of kidnapping by Selten (A simple game model of kidnapping. In: Henn R, Moeschlin O (eds) Mathematical economics and game theory. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol. 141. Springer, Berlin, pp 139–156, 1977). We develop an integrated game-theoretic model that reliably captures both the problem of kidnapping for some sort of non-monetary ransom and the problem of assassination of prominent political figures. We embed our model within the historical evidence surrounding the Moro case. We show that, in the Moro case, there is a continuum of equilibria implying the death of the hostage.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC) in its journal Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History.
Volume (Year): 3 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Kidnapping; Game theory; Terrorism;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
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- M. Vannini & B. McCannon & C. Detotto, 2012. "Understanding Ransom Kidnapping and Its Duration," Working Paper CRENoS 201219, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
- Mark Pingle & Alexander Fink, 2013. "Kidnap Insurance and its Impact on Kidnapping Outcomes," Working Papers 13-001, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics & University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics.
- Alexander Fink & Mark Pingle, 2012. "Kidnap Insurance and its Impact on Kidnapping Outcomes," ICER Working Papers 13-2012, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
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