Equilibrium and Strategic Communication in the Adverse Selection Insurance Model
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 786969000000000243.
Date of creation: 03 Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-09-16 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IAS-2011-09-16 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2011-09-16 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Beaudry, P. & Poitevin, M., 1990.
"Competitive Screening in Financial Market When Borrowers Can Recontract,"
Cahiers de recherche
9035, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Beaudry, Paul & Poitevin, Michel, 1995. "Competitive Screening in Financial Markets When Borrowers Can Recontract," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(3), pages 401-23, July.
- Beaudry, P. & Poitevin, M., 1990. "Competitive Screening In Financial Market When Borrowers Can Recontract," Cahiers de recherche 9035, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Bisin, A. & Guaitoli, D., 1998.
"Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts,"
98-24, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Bisin, Alberto & Guaitoli, Danilo, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1987, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alberto Bisin & Danilo Guaitoli, 1998. "Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts," Economics Working Papers 345, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Hellwig, Martin F., 1988. "A note on the specification of interfirm communication in insurance markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 154-163, October.
- Laurence Ales & Pricila Maziero, 2009. "Adverse Selection and Non-Exclusive Contracts," GSIA Working Papers 2010-E61, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Attar, Andrea & Chassagnon, Arnold, 2009.
"On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 511-525, September.
- Beaudry, Paul & Poitevin, Michel, 1993. "Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(4), pages 745-82, July.
- Seungjin Han, 2012.
"Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
2012-15, McMaster University, revised Apr 2013.
- Han, Seungjin, 2011. "Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection," Microeconomics.ca working papers seungjin_han-2011-10, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 02 Apr 2013.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.