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The Meaning of Deceive in Experimental Economic Science

Author

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  • Bart J. Wilson

    (Chapman University, Economic Science Institute)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Bart J. Wilson, 2014. "The Meaning of Deceive in Experimental Economic Science," Working Papers 14-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:14-05
    as

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    File URL: http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/economic-science-institute/_files/WorkingPapers/the-meaning-of-deceive-in-experimental-economic-science.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andreas Ortmann & Ralph Hertwig, 2002. "The Costs of Deception: Evidence from Psychology," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(2), pages 111-131, October.
    2. Burnham, Terence & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L., 2000. "Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-73, September.
    3. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-955, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gregory Colson & Jay R. Corrigan & Carola Grebitus & Maria L. Loureiro & Matthew C. Rousu, 2016. "Which Deceptive Practices, If Any, Should Be Allowed in Experimental Economics Research? Results from Surveys of Applied Experimental Economists and Students," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 98(2), pages 610-621.
    2. Timothy N. Cason & Steven Y. Wu, 2019. "Subject Pools and Deception in Agricultural and Resource Economics Experiments," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(3), pages 743-758, July.
    3. Eric Schniter & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2014. "Predictable and Predictive Emotions: Explaining Cheap Signals and Trust Re-Extension," Working Papers 14-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    4. Krawczyk, Michał, 2019. "What should be regarded as deception in experimental economics? Evidence from a survey of researchers and subjects," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 110-118.
    5. Peter Katuščák & Tomáš Miklánek, 2023. "What drives conditional cooperation in public good games?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(2), pages 435-467, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    experimental economics; deception; professional ethics of economists;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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