Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Causal Effect of Market Priming on Trust: An Experimental Investigation Using Randomized Control

Contents:

Author Info

  • Al-Ubaydli, Omar
  • Houser, Daniel
  • Nye, John
  • Paganelli, Maria Pia
  • Pan, Xiaofei
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    We report data from laboratory experiments where participants were primed using phrases related to markets and trade. Participants then participated in trust games with anonymous strangers. The decisions of primed participants are compared to those of a control group. We find evidence that priming for market participation affects positively the beliefs regarding the trustworthiness of anonymous strangers and increases trusting decisions.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/11215414/3589397.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Harvard University Department of Economics in its series Scholarly Articles with number 11215414.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 2013
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published in PLoS ONE
    Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:11215414

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Littauer Center, Cambridge, MA 02138
    Phone: 617-495-2144
    Fax: 617-495-7730
    Web page: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-55, December.
    2. Zak, Paul J & Knack, Stephen, 2001. "Trust and Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 295-321, April.
    3. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
    4. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. Margin Dufwenberg & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2001. "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine 563824000000000090, David K. Levine.
    6. Fehr, Ernst, 2008. "On the Economics and Biology of Trust," IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 3895, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
    8. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," Working Papers, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics. 137, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics..
    9. Burnham, Terence & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L., 2000. "Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-73, September.
    10. Frey, Bruno S & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1997. "The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 746-55, September.
    11. Michael Kosfeld & Armin Falk, 2006. "The Hidden Costs of Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1611-1630, December.
    12. Glaeser, Edward Ludwig & Laibson, David I. & Scheinkman, Jose A. & Soutter, Christine L., 2000. "Measuring Trust," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics 4481497, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    13. Andrew Reeson & John Tisdell, 2010. "The Market Instinct: The Demise of Social Preferences for Self-Interest," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(3), pages 439-453, November.
    14. Joseph Henrich, 2001. "In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 73-78, May.
    15. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-88, November.
    16. Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc, 2010. "Inherited Trust and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2060-92, December.
    17. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-77, June.
    18. Cristina Bicchieri & Erte Xiao & Ryan Muldoon, 2011. "Trustworthiness is a Social Norm, but Trusting is Not," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , , vol. 10(2), pages 170-187, May.
    19. Cox, James C., 2004. "How to identify trust and reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 260-281, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Eric Schniter & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2014. "Predictable and Predictive Emotions: Explaining Cheap Signals and Trust Re-Extension," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 14-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    2. Thomas Buser & Anna Dreber, 2013. "The Flipside of Comparative Payment Schemes," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 13-190/I, Tinbergen Institute.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:11215414. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ben Steinberg).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.