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How Does Party Discipline Affect Legislative Behavior? Evidence from Within-Session Variation in Lame Duck Status

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  • Jon H. Fiva
  • Oda Nedregård

Abstract

How important are political parties in motivating and disciplining elected officials? Using a difference-in-discontinuity design, we study how shocks to incumbents’ re-election probabilities affect legislative behavior in a setting where parties fully control candidate selection. We find that within-session variation in lame-duck status has a strong negative effect on the probability of showing up in parliament to vote. We find, however, no clear evidence that lame-duck status affects the extent to which legislators deviate from the party line. Our findings align well with the citizen-candidate framework, where candidates have fixed ideological positions that do not vary based on electoral incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Jon H. Fiva & Oda Nedregård, 2022. "How Does Party Discipline Affect Legislative Behavior? Evidence from Within-Session Variation in Lame Duck Status," CESifo Working Paper Series 9697, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9697
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political parties; party discipline; roll-call votes; legislative speech; difference-in-discontinuity design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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