IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_8621.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Replicator Evolution of Welfare Stigma: Welfare Fraud vs. Incomplete Take-Up

Author

Listed:
  • Jun-ichi Itaya
  • Kenichi Kurita

Abstract

There are two important problems in welfare benefit programs: the prevalence of welfare fraud, in which ineligible people receive welfare benefits, and incomplete take-up, whereby eligible poor people are reluctant to claim welfare benefits. This study investigates both of these opposing phenomena using simple replicator models of statistical discrimination and the tax-payer resentment view welfare stigma suggested by Besley and Coate (1992). We find multiple stable equilibria in the long run, one of which entails low welfare fraud and 100% incomplete take-up and the other of which entails high welfare fraud and complete take-up in either model, and, moreover, that an interior stationary equilibrium that allows for the coexistence of welfare fraud and incomplete take-up is unstable in the model of statistical discrimination view welfare stigma, but it is stable in the model of the tax-payer resentment view welfare stigma. This difference arises from the different nature of stigma cost functions in these two models.

Suggested Citation

  • Jun-ichi Itaya & Kenichi Kurita, 2020. "Replicator Evolution of Welfare Stigma: Welfare Fraud vs. Incomplete Take-Up," CESifo Working Paper Series 8621, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8621
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp8621.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35.
    2. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
    3. Saurabh Bhargava & Dayanand Manoli, 2015. "Psychological Frictions and the Incomplete Take-Up of Social Benefits: Evidence from an IRS Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(11), pages 3489-3529, November.
    4. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Understanding welfare stigma: Taxpayer resentment and statistical discrimination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 165-183, July.
    5. Rebecca M. Blank & Patricia Ruggles, 1996. "When Do Women Use Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Food Stamps? The Dynamics of Eligibility Versus Participation," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 31(1), pages 57-89.
    6. Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth & Efraim Sadka, 2015. "Welfare Stigma Re-Examined," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(6), pages 874-886, December.
    7. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    8. Regina T. Riphahn, 2001. "Rational Poverty or Poor Rationality? The Take‐up of Social Assistance Benefits," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 47(3), pages 379-398, September.
    9. Yaniv, Gideon, 1997. "Welfare fraud and welfare stigma," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 435-451, June.
    10. Duclos, Jean-Yves, 1995. "Modelling the take-up of state support," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 391-415, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kenichi Kurita & Nobuaki Hori & Yuya Katafuchi, 2022. "Stigma model of welfare fraud and non‐take‐up: Theory and evidence from OECD panel data," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(3), pages 310-338, September.
    2. Hamamura, Jumpei & Kurita, Kenichi, 2021. "Does stigma against tax avoidance improve social welfare?," MPRA Paper 107173, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Kenichi Kurita & Shunsuke Managi, 2022. "COVID-19 and Stigma: Evolution of Self-restraint Behavior," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 168-182, March.
    4. Kino, Shiho & Nishioka, Daisuke & Ueno, Keiko & Saito, Masashige & Kondo, Naoki, 2022. "Changes in social relationships by the initiation and termination of public assistance in the older Japanese population: A JAGES panel study," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 293(C).
    5. Yuya Katafuchi & Kenichi Kurita & Shunsuke Managi, 2021. "COVID-19 with Stigma: Theory and Evidence from Mobility Data," Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 71-95, April.
    6. Kurita, Kenichi, 2021. "Comparative institutional analysis of poverty-alleviation systems: Does basic income improve social welfare?," MPRA Paper 107177, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Katafuchi, Yuya & Kurita, Kenichi & Managi, Shunsuke, 2020. "Self-restraint behavior under COVID-19 through stigma: Theory and evidence based on mobility data," MPRA Paper 102182, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Friedrichsen, Jana & König, Tobias & Schmacker, Renke, 2018. "Social image concerns and welfare take-up," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 174-192.
    2. Friedrichsen, Jana & König, Tobias & Schmacker, Renke, 2016. "Welfare stigma in the lab: Evidence of social signaling," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2016-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    3. Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka & Yoram Margalioth, 2008. "The Role of Stigma in the Design of Welfare Programs," Working Papers 0806, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    4. Kenichi Kurita & Nobuaki Hori & Yuya Katafuchi, 2022. "Stigma model of welfare fraud and non‐take‐up: Theory and evidence from OECD panel data," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(3), pages 310-338, September.
    5. Terracol, Antoine, 2009. "Guaranteed minimum income and unemployment duration in France," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 171-182, April.
    6. Dahlia K. Remler & Jason E. Rachlin & Sherry A. Glied, 2001. "What can the take-up of other programs teach us about how to improve take-up of health insurance programs?," NBER Working Papers 8185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Sylvain Chareyron, 2016. "Le non-recours aux aides sociales sous conditions de ressources," Erudite Ph.D Dissertations, Erudite, number ph16-01 edited by Yannick L'Horty & François Legendre, February.
    8. Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth & Efraim Sadka, 2008. "The Role of Stigma in the Design of Welfare Programs," CESifo Working Paper Series 2305, CESifo.
    9. Kurita, Kenichi & Hori, Nobuaki & Katafuchi, Yuya, 2019. "Model of endogenous welfare stigma: Statistical discrimination view," MPRA Paper 98299, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Regina T. Riphahn, 2001. "Rational Poverty or Poor Rationality? The Take‐up of Social Assistance Benefits," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 47(3), pages 379-398, September.
    11. Sylvain Chareyron & Patrick Domingues, 2018. "Take‐Up of Social Assistance Benefits: The Case of the French Homeless," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 64(1), pages 170-191, March.
    12. Yuya Katafuchi & Kenichi Kurita & Shunsuke Managi, 2021. "COVID-19 with Stigma: Theory and Evidence from Mobility Data," Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 71-95, April.
    13. Olivier Bargain, 2017. "Welfare analysis and redistributive policies," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 15(4), pages 393-419, December.
    14. Bargain, Olivier & Immervoll, Herwig & Viitamäki, Heikki, 2007. "How Tight Are Safety-Nets in Nordic Countries? Evidence from Finnish Register Data," IZA Discussion Papers 3004, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. Sylvain Chareyron & Patrick Domingues, 2015. "Take-up of Social Assistance Benefits: The case of Homeless," TEPP Working Paper 2015-07, TEPP.
    16. Blumkin, Tomer & Margalioth, Yoram & Sadka, Efraim, 2013. "Welfare Stigma Re-examined," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275791, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    17. Kenichi Kurita & Shunsuke Managi, 2022. "COVID-19 and Stigma: Evolution of Self-restraint Behavior," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 168-182, March.
    18. Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2007. "Redistributive Taxation under Ethical Behaviour," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(3), pages 505-529, September.
    19. Contini, Dalit & Richiardi, Matteo G., 2012. "Reconsidering the effect of welfare stigma on unemployment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 229-244.
    20. Thomas Eichner & Daniel Weinreich, 2015. "Welfare stigma and risk taking in the welfare state," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(2), pages 319-348, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    stigma; replicator dynamics; incomplete take-up; welfare fraud; non-take-up;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8621. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.