Introducing Activity-Based Payment in the Hospital Industry: Evidence from French Data
AbstractMany countries have reformed hospital reimbursement policies to provide stronger incentives for quality and cost reduction. The purpose of this work is to understand how the effect of such reforms depends on the intensity of local competition. We build a nonprice competition model to examine the effect of a shift from global budget to patient-based payment for public hospitals in France. We predict that the number of patient admissions should increase in public hospitals by more than in private clinics and that the increase in admissions is stronger in public hospitals more exposed to competitive pressure from private clinics. Considering the reform implemented in France between 2005 and 2008, we find empirical evidence supporting these predictions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 4304.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
health care markets; prospective payment system; local competition; not-for-profit hospitals;
Other versions of this item:
- P. Choné & F. Evain & L. Wilner & E. Yilmaz, 2013. "Introducing activity-based payment in the hospital industry: Evidence from French data," Documents de Travail de la DESE - Working Papers of the DESE, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, DESE g2013-11, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, DESE.
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- #HEJC papers for August 2013
by academichealtheconomists in The Academic Health Economists' Blog on 2013-07-31 23:00:48
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