Leakage, Welfare, and Cost-Effectiveness of Carbon Policy
AbstractWe extend the model of Fullerton, Karney, and Baylis (2012 working paper) to explore cost-effectiveness of unilateral climate policy in the presence of leakage. We ignore the welfare gain from reducing greenhouse gas emissions and focus on the welfare cost of the emissions tax or permit scheme. Whereas that prior paper solves for changes in emissions quantities and finds that leakage maybe negative, we show here that all cases with negative leakage in that model are cases where a unilateral carbon tax results in a welfare loss. With positive leakage, however, a unilateral policy can improve welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 4101.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
trade and environment; pollution havens; unilateral climate policy;
Other versions of this item:
- Kathy Baylis & Don Fullerton & Daniel H. Karney, 2013. "Leakage, Welfare, and Cost-Effectiveness of Carbon Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 332-37, May.
- Kathy Baylis & Don Fullerton & Daniel H. Karney, 2013. "Leakage, Welfare, and Cost-Effectiveness of Carbon Policy," NBER Working Papers 18898, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Metcalf, Gilbert & Weisbach, David, 2009.
"The Design of a Carbon Tax,"
- Gilbert Metcalf & David Weisbach, 2008. "The Design of a Carbon Tax," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0727, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Gilbert Metcalf & David Weisbach, 2008. "The Design of a Carbon Tax," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0728, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Hans-Jürgen Nantke & Alfred Endres & Frederik Schaff & Till Requate & Susanne Dröge, 2013. "Scheitern der Reform des Emissionshandels: Verliert Europa die Vorreiterrolle in der Klimapolitik?," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 66(12), pages 03-15, 06.
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