From Collapse to Constitution: The Case of Iceland
AbstractMost of the time, crises precede constitutions. Following a brief review of relevant historical background, this article aims to show why Iceland, after its financial collapse in 2008, is now at last on the road to adopting a new constitution to replace the provisional constitution from 1944. The aim is also to show how the constitutional bill of 2011 came into being with significant help from the general public. Further, the article outlines some of the key provisions of the bill as well as why and how it differs from the current constitution. The article concludes by offering a brief discussion of some potential obstacles to the adoption of the bill in parliament, the role of the public, and some lessons from, and for, other countries.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3770.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ragnar Torvik & Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2011.
"Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?,"
Working Paper Series
11711, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2013. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," Working Papers 0010, Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP), BI Norwegian Business School.
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2011. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000287, David K. Levine.
- Ragnar Torvik & Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," Working Paper Series 13913, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2011. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?," NBER Working Papers 17293, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andersen, Jørgen Juel & Aslaksen, Silje, 2008.
"Constitutions and the resource curse,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 227-246, October.
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 8973.
- Brennan, Geoffrey & Buchanan, James M., 1977. "Towards a tax constitution for Leviathan," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 255-273, December.
- Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2012.
"Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1446-76, June.
- Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2008. "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs," NBER Working Papers 14239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Konstantin Sonin & Georgy Egorov & Daron Acemoglu, 2008. "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions and Clubs," 2008 Meeting Papers 314, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, 2001. "Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, And Common Stock Investment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 261-292, February.
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000.
"Why Did The West Extend The Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, And Growth In Historical Perspective,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199, November.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1998. "Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 1797, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ackerman, John, 2004. "Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond "Exit" and "Voice"," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 447-463, March.
- Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, 2012.
"Human Rights Violations after 9/11 and the Role of Constitutional Constraints,"
The Journal of Legal Studies,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 131 - 164.
- Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, 2009. "Human Rights Violations After 9/11 and the Role of Constitutional Constraints," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 11, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, 2009. "Human Rights Violations after 9/11 and the Role of Constitutional Constraints," Economics Series Working Papers 425, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2002.
Economics Working Papers
896, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2005.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "The Economic Effects of Constitutions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661926, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.