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Finite-Population "Mass-Action" and Evolutionary Stability

Author

Listed:
  • Axel Bernergard
  • Karl Wärneryd

Abstract

Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding “mass-action” equilibrium. We show that for mixed strategy equilibria of 2 × 2 games, the requirement of such a correspondence is equivalent to neutral evolutionary stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Axel Bernergard & Karl Wärneryd, 2011. "Finite-Population "Mass-Action" and Evolutionary Stability," CESifo Working Paper Series 3378, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3378
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Young, H. Peyton, 2011. "Commentary: John Nash and evolutionary game theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 12-13, January.
    2. Leonard, Robert J, 1994. "Reading Cournot, Reading Nash: The Creation and Stabilisation of the Nash Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(424), pages 492-511, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    mass action; finite population games; evolutionary stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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