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Nash, el último fundador de la teoría de juegos, y la evolución del concepto de equilibrio desde Cournot

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  • Jorge M. Streb

Abstract

Nash recibió el premio Nobel de economía por dos aportes fundamentales: la distinción entre juegos cooperativos y no cooperativos, y el concepto de solución básico para juegos no cooperativos. Myerson indica que este equilibrio es el concepto de solución básico de teoría de juegos dado que, como señala Nash, los juegos cooperativos se pueden reducir a un juego no cooperativo más amplio agregando la negociación previa. El equilibrio de Nash puede verse también como equilibrio de Cournot-Nash porque fue originalmente formulado por Cournot en un modelo de oligopolio, aunque al ser una aplicación específica esto es discutido. El problema fundamental, sin embargo, fue que el análisis de Cournot llevó a polémicas interminables sobre cómo se llega al equilibrio. Otro aporte fundamental de Nash, en mi opinión, es resolver esto con su interpretación racionalista, donde los jugadores conocen la estructura del juego y usan la solución para predecir el equilibrio. Nash introduce así las expectativas racionales. Alternativamente, ofrece una interpretación adaptativa cuando los jugadores no conocen la estructura de juego pero ajustan sus estrategias para maximizar sus pagos, algo anticipado por Cournot al analizar la elasticidad de demanda. La teoría de juegos evolutiva desarrolla esta segunda interpretación. En suma, Nash no solo fue extraordinario como matemático sino como economista.

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  • Jorge M. Streb, 2015. "Nash, el último fundador de la teoría de juegos, y la evolución del concepto de equilibrio desde Cournot," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 572, Universidad del CEMA.
  • Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:572
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Robert J. Leonard, 1992. "Reading Cournot, Reading Nash / or / The Emergence and Stabilization of the Nash equilibrium," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9214, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
    3. Leonard, Robert J, 1994. "Reading Cournot, Reading Nash: The Creation and Stabilisation of the Nash Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(424), pages 492-511, May.
    4. Roger B. Myerson, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1067-1082, September.
    5. Nicola Giocoli, 2003. "Modeling Rational Agents," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2585.
    6. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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