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Some Aspects of the Economics of Catastrophe Risk Insurance

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  • Christian Gollier

Abstract

The ability to share risk efficiently in the economy is essential to welfare and growth. However, the increased frequency of natural catastrophes over the last decade has raised once again questions associated to the limits of insurability in a free-market economy, and to the relevance of public interventions on risk-sharing markets. In this paper, we explore the potential reasons for the lack of insurance specifically associated to catastrophe environmental risks. Our final aim is to link each source of possible market inefficiency to its possible remedies.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1409.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1409

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  1. Marianne Baxter & Urban J. Jermann, 1995. "The International Diversification Puzzle is Worse Than You Think," NBER Working Papers 5019, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Raviv, Artur, 1979. "The Design of an Optimal Insurance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 84-96, March.
  3. GOLLIER, Christian, . "Pareto-optimal risk sharing with fixed costs per claim," CORE Discussion Papers RP -774, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Christian Gollier, 2004. "The Economics of Risk and Time," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262572249, December.
  5. Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1994. "Environmental Risks and Bank Liability," CIRANO Working Papers 94s-22, CIRANO.
  6. Deaton, Angus, 1991. "Saving and Liquidity Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1221-48, September.
  7. Eeckhoudt, L. & Gollier, C., 1996. "The Insurance of Low Probability Events," Papers 976.423, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  8. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  9. Kunreuther, Howard & Hogarth, Robin & Meszaros, Jacqueline, 1993. " Insurer Ambiguity and Maarket Failure," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 71-87, August.
  10. Christian Gollier, 2003. "To Insure or Not to Insure?: An Insurance Puzzle," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 28(1), pages 5-24, June.
  11. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
  12. Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, 2003. "You Only Die Once: Managing Discrete Interdependent Risks," NBER Working Papers 9885, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
  1. Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 2009. "Risk selection in natural disaster insurance," Working Papers 2009/6, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  2. Mario JAMETTI & Thomas VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, 2006. "Risk Selection in Natural Disaster Insurance -The Case of France," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 06.02, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  3. Rodrigo S. Targino & Gareth W. Peters & Georgy Sofronov & Pavel V. Shevchenko, 2013. "Optimal insurance purchase strategies via optimal multiple stopping times," Papers 1312.0424, arXiv.org.
  4. Feduzi, Alberto & Runde, Jochen, 2011. "The uncertain foundations of the welfare state," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 613-627.
  5. Matthias Schmidt & Hermann Held & Elmar Kriegler & Alexander Lorenz, 2013. "Climate Policy Under Uncertain and Heterogeneous Climate Damages," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 54(1), pages 79-99, January.
  6. Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 2009. "Hurricane Insurance in Florida," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 09.01, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  7. Zhu, Wenge, 2011. "Ambiguity aversion and an intertemporal equilibrium model of catastrophe-linked securities pricing," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 38-46, July.

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