On the Performance of Social Benefit Systems
AbstractThe paper analyses the performance of unemployment benefit systems in a search-theoretic framework. The criteria of evaluation comprise the alleviation of poverty and the reduction in income inequality, whilst the diversity of opinions about these is taken into account. Also, the trade-off between the attainment of social objectives and work incentives is examined.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE in its series STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers with number 28.
Date of creation: Apr 1997
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Web page: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/default.asp
Unemployment insurance; pay-roll taxation; poverty; inequality; welfare;
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- Foster, James & Greer, Joel & Thorbecke, Erik, 1984. "A Class of Decomposable Poverty Measures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(3), pages 761-66, May.
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- Yaari, Menahem E., 1976. "A law of large numbers in the theory of consumer's choice under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 202-217, April.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Workfare versus Welfare Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 249-61, March.
- Goerke, Laszlo & Madsen, Jakob B., 2003. "Earnings-related unemployment benefits and unemployment," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 41-62, March.
- Thomas Beissinger & Oliver Büsse, 2001.
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- Beissinger, Thomas & Buesse, Oliver, 2001. "Bismarck versus Beveridge: Which Unemployment Compensation System is More Prone to Labor Market Shocks?," IZA Discussion Papers 358, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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