Default risk in business groups
AbstractThis paper analyzes how combining firms into either groups or conglomerates affects their credit standing, as measured by their de- fault probabilities, recovery rates and credit spreads. Each combina- tion offers protection against default to its affiliates, and issues debt to optimize the trade-off between tax gains and default costs. In a group, the probability of joint default turns out to be lower than that of both stand-alone firms and conglomerates. This is the bright side of credit risk in groups. The dark side is that affiliation depletes the credit worthiness of the subsidiary. Such results hold irrespective of cash- ow correlation, if affiliates are equal in size, but fade if the parent is larger.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 283.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
credit risk; structural models; groups; mergers; parent- subsidiary.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michael C. Jensen, 1991. "Corporate Control And The Politics Of Finance," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 4(2), pages 13-34.
- Tykvová, Tereza & Borell, Mariela, 2011.
"Do private equity owners increase risk of financial distress and bankruptcy?,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
11-076, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Tykvová, Tereza & Borell, Mariela, 2012. "Do private equity owners increase risk of financial distress and bankruptcy?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 138-150.
- Elisa Luciano & Clas Wihlborg, 2013. "The Organization of Bank Affiliates; A Theoretical Perspective on Risk and Efficiency," ICER Working Papers 06-2013, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
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