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Ex Ante Liability Rules in New Zealand's Health and Safety in Employment Act: A Law and Economics Analysis

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Author Info
Paul Gordon
Alan E. Woodfield () (University of Canterbury)

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Abstract

In addition to penalties imposed for breaches of statutory duties in the event of workplace accidents involving physical harms, New Zealand's Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 also provides for penalties where accidents have not occurred. Ordinary negligence rules are ex post in that both an accident and harm must occur before liability accrues, whereas ex ante liability rules create liability for deficient care per se. This paper examines whether liability for breaches of duty that do not give rise to accidents have a useful incentive-enhancing role for health and safety decisions by employers in the New Zealand context when used in conjunction with ex post liability rules. We argue that ex post rules by themselves are insufficient to induce appropriate levels of precaution due to the combined presence of weak penalties and considerable uncertainty surrounding the Courts' required standard of care. Merely augmenting ex post liability with ex ante liability, however, is unlikely to induce desirable levels of employer precautions. Further, more strict ex ante standards than socially optimal precaution levels may be desirable since inspection probabilities, prosecution rates, and penalties for breaches of ex ante standards are relatively low, providing some justification for the relatively stringent safety regulations and required standard of care observed in New Zealand. Nevetheless, a weaker but less uncertain standard may instead induce a small degree of overprecaution, removing the need for ex ante regulations from this particular perspective.

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File URL: http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/RePEc/cbt/econwp/0602.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Canterbury, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 06/02.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cbt:econwp:06/02

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Web page: http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz
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Related research
Keywords: ex ante and ex post liability; safety incentives; health and safety standards; uncertainty;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Steven Shavell, 1984. "A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 271-280, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Paul Gordon & Alan E. Woodfield, 2006. "Incentives and the Changing Structure of Penalties in New Zealand's Health and Safety in Employment Act," Working Papers in Economics 06/03, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
  4. Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Paul Gordon & Alan E. Woodfield, 2006. "Incentives and the Changing Structure of Penalties in New Zealand's Health and Safety in Employment Act," Working Papers in Economics 06/03, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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