The relationship between regulation and competition policy for network utilities
AbstractShould regulation of potentially competitive elements of network utilities be left with sector regulators or solely subject to normal competition laws? Britain evolved licenses for network activities overseen by regulators while the EU places more emphasis on making sector regulation consistent with competition law. The paper discusses the appropriateness of the competition law approach for telecoms and electricity. Post-modern utilities like telecoms, in which facilities-based competition is possible, lend themselves to the approach laid out in the Communications Directives, and its application to mobile call termination is discussed. Electricity, where collective dominance is more likely, does not fit comfortably into this approach. Instead, licence conditions retain advantages where it may be necessary to modify market rules in a timely and well-informed manner, as exemplified by the English Electricity Pool.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0631.
Date of creation: Feb 2006
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Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm
Regulation; competition policy; telecommunications; electricity; market power;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-04-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-04-08 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2006-04-08 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-ENE-2006-04-08 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-IND-2006-04-08 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2006-04-08 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2006-04-08 (Network Economics)
- NEP-REG-2006-04-08 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Peter A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1968. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production," Working papers 22, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Martin Hellwig, 2008. "Competition Policy and Sector-Specific Regulation for Network Industries," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_29, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- SMEERS, Yves, 2005. "How well can one measure market power in restructured electricity systems ?," CORE Discussion Papers 2005050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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