Tax neutrality and the social discount rate : A suggested framework
Abstract
There is probably no specific problem in tax analysis which has generated as much study and discussion among economists as the question of how to formulate "neutral" tax incentives for investment. Yet no consensus has been reached concerning the proper approach to take when adjusting taxes. Comparing the two fundamental notions of neutrality found in the literature, referred to here as "present value" rules and "internal rate of return" rules, we argue that there is both a single appropriate neutrality criterion (the latter) and a framework which can be used to evaluate the performance of a tax system with respect to this criterion.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 17 (1982)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Pages: 355-372
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Alan J. Auerbach, 1982. "Tax Neutrality and the Social Discount Rate: A Suggested Framework," NBER Working Papers 0457, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barro, Robert J., 1974.
"Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?,"
Scholarly Articles
3451399, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec..
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Mark E. Doms & Wendy E. Dunn & Stephen D. Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, 2004.
"How fast do personal computers depreciate? concepts and new estimates,"
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
2004-31, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Mark E. Doms & Wendy F. Dunn & Stephen D. Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, 2004. "How Fast do Personal Computers Depreciate? Concepts and New Estimates," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 18, pages 37-80 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mark E. Doms & Wendy E. Dunn & Stephen D. Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, 2004. "How Fast Do Personal Computers Depreciate? Concepts and New Estimates," NBER Working Papers 10521, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mark E. Doms & Wendy E. Dunn & Stephen D. Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, 2003. "How fast do personal computers depreciate? concepts and new estimates," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 2003-20, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- Jack, William & Viard, Alan D., 1996. "Production efficiency and the design of temporary investment incentives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 87-106, July.
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