Russia's Integration into the World Economy: An Interjurisdictional Competition View
AbstractThe aim of the paper is to analyze the problems of Russia´s integration into the world economy from the point of view of the theory of interjurisdictional competition. It argues, that huge exit-effects in the Russian economy do not lead to increasing quality of institutions and economic policies. In order to explain this situation, the paper focuses on the demand and supply sides of the market for institutions and public policies. Their behavior patterns contribute to the stabilization of the inefficient equilibrium. From the normative point of view, the result of the paper is that Russia´s integration into the world economy can succeed, only if the political institutions are transformed and centers of private economic power are weakened.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universitätsbibliothek Wuppertal, University Library in its series EIIW Discussion paper with number disbei134.
Length: 34 Pages
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://elpub.bib.uni-wuppertal.de
Economic integration; Russia; interjurisdictional competition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
- F0 - International Economics - - General
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- Marek Dabrowski & Radzislawa Gortat, 2002. "Political Determinants of Economic Reforms in Former Communist Countries," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0242, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
- Sonin, Konstantin, 2003.
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- Konstantin Sonin, 2002. "Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 544, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Konstantin Sonin, 2003. "Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights," Working Papers w0022, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Baer, Werner & Cavalcanti, Tiago & Silva, Peri, 2002. "Economic integration without policy coordination: the case of Mercosur," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 269-291, September.
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