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TQuantity versus Quality in Medical Care: Evidence from State Variation in Telemedicine Regulation

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Author Info
Anca Cotet () (Department of Economics, Ball State University)
Abstract

This paper uses variation in state by state regulation affecting telemedicine to investigate whether the quality standards imposed by current medical regulations are too high. The Physical Examination Requirement (PER) regulation prohibits certain physician-patient telemedicine practices, expected to be of lower quality than face-to-face consultations, in order to prevent the erosion of current quality standards. At the same time however, PER makes it more difficult for some individuals to obtain professional medical advice. The empirical results suggest that states that adopted such regulation experience an increase in mortality in some sub-populations. Specifically, such improved outcomes appear in more sparsely populated areas, in areas with low physician density in total population, for individuals earning relatively low or relatively high wages, and are more likely for infants and adults ages 24 through 65. In aggregate PER leads to an increase in infant mortality and no significant effect on other age groups, an indication that easier access to professional medical advice through telemedicine even at the cost of lower quality improves outcomes.

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File URL: http://web.bsu.edu/cob/econ/research/papers/bsuecwp200902cotet.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2009
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Ball State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 200902.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2009
Date of revision: Feb 2009
Handle: RePEc:bsu:wpaper:200902

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law

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  1. Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2008. "First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 123(2), pages 795-830, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Leffler, Keith B, 1978. "Physician Licensure: Competition and Monopoly in American Medicine," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 165-86, April.
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.


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