Contracting with a Time-Inconsistent Agent
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bogazici University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2010/15.
Date of creation: 2010
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- Eisenhuth, Roland, 2010. "Auction Design with Loss Averse Bidders: The Optimality of All Pay Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 23357, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Luigi Balletta & Giovanni Immordino, 2013. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with a Present Biased Agent," CSEF Working Papers 341, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
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