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Punishment and Grace: on the Economics of Permanent Amnesties

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  • L. A. Franzoni

Abstract

This paper extends the literature on tax amnesties by consid-ering two special grace programmes. The first is an offer by the government not to investigate taxpayers' accounts, the second not to prosecute indicted evaders. I analyse the impact of both measures on the taxpayers' optimal behaviour and the government's net revenue, and derive the conditions under which it would be desir-able to implement them on a permanent basis.

Suggested Citation

  • L. A. Franzoni, 1996. "Punishment and Grace: on the Economics of Permanent Amnesties," Working Papers 252, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  • Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:252
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