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Weak regulation, game theory and ineffectiveness of the EU Information & Consultation Directive in liberal economies

Author

Listed:
  • Anthony Dobbins

    (Bangor University)

  • Tony Dundon

    (NUI Galway, Ireland)

  • Niall Culliname

    (Queens University Belfast)

  • Eugene Hickland

    (NUI Galway, Ireland)

  • Jimmy Donaghey

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

This article provides theoretical and empirical insights relating to impact of the European Information and Consultation Directive (ICD). While existing research on the ICD offers important empirical insights, there is a need for further theoretical analysis to explain ineffectiveness of the regulations in liberal market economies (LMEs). Drawing on data from 16 case studies, the article uses game theory and the prisoners dilemma framework to explain why national implementing legislation is ineffective in diffusing mutual gains cooperation in two LMEs: UK, Republic of Ireland. Three theoretical propositions advance understanding of the ineffectiveness of national information & consultation regulations in LMEs.

Suggested Citation

  • Anthony Dobbins & Tony Dundon & Niall Culliname & Eugene Hickland & Jimmy Donaghey, 2015. "Weak regulation, game theory and ineffectiveness of the EU Information & Consultation Directive in liberal economies," Working Papers 15010, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
    • Handle: RePEc:bng:wpaper:15010
    as

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    File URL: http://www.bangor.ac.uk/business/research/documents/BBSWP-15-10.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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