Promiscuous Elites and Economic Development
AbstractThis paper analyzes the interconnection between elites and its effects on economic growth. For decades, the bureaucratic elite has been joining the business elite after leaving office, and this in growing numbers. This relationship has been termed “the revolving door” in English, “pantouflage” in French, and “amakudari” [descent from heaven] in Japanese. The purpose of this paper is to explain why this social behavior takes place, and why the political elite does not try to prevent it. Moreover, this paper shows that the bureaucratic elite obtains excessive bureaucratic power, and that promiscuous elites actually lead to lower economic growth.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University in its series Working Papers with number 2012-09.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Faculty of Social Sciences, Bar Ilan University 52900 Ramat-Gan
Phone: Phone: +972-3-5318345
Web page: http://econ.biu.ac.il
More information through EDIRC
elites; bureaucracy; abuse of power; revolving door; economic growth.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- O11 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-FDG-2012-12-22 (Financial Development & Growth)
- NEP-HME-2012-12-22 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2012-12-22 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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