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Public works in Italy: time to completion and its determinants

Author

Listed:
  • Carla Carlucci

    (Agency for Territorial Cohesion)

  • Cristina Giorgiantonio

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Tommaso Orlando

    (Bank of Italy)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the overall duration of public works projects in Italy, as well as that of the individual phases of their realization. It exploits a database created and managed by the Agency for Territorial Cohesion, containing information on projects undertaken in the period 2000-2013 under EU cohesion policies. Using statistical duration models, we show that a relevant contribution to the overall time to completion is attributable to the design phase, as well as to a set of “ancillary activities” having mainly procedural and bureaucratic nature. Focusing on the municipalities of Southern Italy, the second part of the paper presents evidence on the correlation between project duration and some characteristics of the administrative and institutional environment. Relationships emerge, in particular, between time to completion and the composition of the public workforce employed by municipalities, the composition of local political bodies, and individual characteristics of mayors. The type of procedure used for awarding the contracts, on the other hands, affects realization duration only weakly.

Suggested Citation

  • Carla Carlucci & Cristina Giorgiantonio & Tommaso Orlando, 2019. "Public works in Italy: time to completion and its determinants," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 538, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_538_19
    as

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    File URL: https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2019-0538/QEF_538_19.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Audinga Baltrunaite & Cristina Giorgiantonio & Sauro Mocetti & Tommaso Orlando, 2021. "Discretion and Supplier Selection in Public Procurement [Formal and Real Authority in Organizations]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 134-166.
    2. Decarolis, Francesco & Giorgiantonio, Cristina, 2015. "Local public procurement regulations: The case of Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 209-226.
    3. Audinga Baltrunaite, 2020. "Political Contributions and Public Procurement: Evidence from Lithuania," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 541-582.
    4. Baltrunaite, Audinga & Bello, Piera & Casarico, Alessandra & Profeta, Paola, 2014. "Gender quotas and the quality of politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 62-74.
    5. Gianmarco Daniele & Benny Geys, 2015. "Organised Crime, Institutions and Political Quality: Empirical Evidence from Italian Municipalities," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(586), pages 233-255, August.
    6. Francesco Decarolis, 2018. "Comparing Public Procurement Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 391-419, May.
    7. Olga Chiappinelli, 2020. "Decentralization And Public Procurement Performance: New Evidence From Italy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(2), pages 856-880, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public works; public procurement; cohesion policies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy

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