This paper analyzes optimal monetary policy in a two-country model with asymmetric shocks. Agents insure against risk through the exchange of Arrow-Debreu securities. Although central banks commit to the policy that maximizes domestic welfare, this does not lead to price stability. In an attempt to improve their country’s terms of trade of securities, central banks may choose an inflationary policy rule in good states. If both central banks do so, the effects on the terms of trade wash out, leaving both countries worse off. Countries facing asymmetric shocks may therefore gain from monetary cooperation.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit F3 - International Economics - - International Finance F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
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