IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bca/bocawp/20-43.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Outside Investor Access to Top Management: Market Monitoring versus Stock Price Manipulation

Author

Listed:
  • Josef Schroth

Abstract

This paper studies the role of voluntary disclosure in crowding out independent research about firm value. In the model, when inside firm owners make it easier for outside investors to obtain inexpensive biased information from the manager, investors rely less on costly unbiased research. As a result, managers are tempted to manipulate the firm stock price more, but investors are better informed because they anticipate manager manipulation. An increase in stock-price informativeness, therefore, has to be traded off against an increase in resources wasted on manipulation. I find that, surprisingly, firm owners grant investors more access to managers that manipulate more strongly. An implication is that the firm cost of capital is negatively related to manager manipulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Josef Schroth, 2020. "Outside Investor Access to Top Management: Market Monitoring versus Stock Price Manipulation," Staff Working Papers 20-43, Bank of Canada.
    • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:20-43
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/swp2020-43.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2012. "Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 195-234, February.
    2. Jeremy C. Stein, 1989. "Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(4), pages 655-669.
    3. Green, T. Clifton & Jame, Russell & Markov, Stanimir & Subasi, Musa, 2014. "Access to management and the informativeness of analyst research," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 239-255.
    4. Francis, Jennifer & Douglas Hanna, J. & Philbrick, Donna R., 1997. "Management communications with securities analysts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 363-394, December.
    5. Stephen Terry & Anastasia Zakolyukina & Toni Whited, 2018. "Information Distortion, R&D, and Growth," 2018 Meeting Papers 217, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2016. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(2), pages 305-370.
    7. Alex Edmans & Mirko S. Heinle & Chong Huang, 2016. "The Real Costs of Financial Efficiency When Some Information Is Soft," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 20(6), pages 2151-2182.
    8. Brian J. Bushee & Michael J. Jung & Gregory S. Miller, 2011. "Conference Presentations and the Disclosure Milieu," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(5), pages 1163-1192, December.
    9. Fishman, Michael J & Hagerty, Kathleen M, 1989. " Disclosure Decisions by Firms and the Competition for Price Efficienc y," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 633-646, July.
    10. Corey Garriot & Ryan Riordan, 2020. "Trading on Long-term Information," Staff Working Papers 20-20, Bank of Canada.
    11. Goldman, Eitan & Slezak, Steve L., 2006. "An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 603-626, June.
    12. Karthik Balakrishnan & Mary Brooke Billings & Bryan Kelly & Alexander Ljungqvist, 2014. "Shaping Liquidity: On the Causal Effects of Voluntary Disclosure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(5), pages 2237-2278, October.
    13. Günter Strobl, 2013. "Earnings Manipulation and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 449-473, May.
    14. Graham, John R. & Harvey, Campbell R. & Rajgopal, Shiva, 2005. "The economic implications of corporate financial reporting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-3), pages 3-73, December.
    15. William J. Mayew & Mohan Venkatachalam, 2012. "The Power of Voice: Managerial Affective States and Future Firm Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 1-44, February.
    16. Lev, B & Zarowin, P, 1999. "The boundaries of financial reporting and how to extend them," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 353-385.
    17. Aboody, David & Kasznik, Ron, 2000. "CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 73-100, February.
    18. D. Eric Hirst & Lisa Koonce & Shankar Venkataraman, 2007. "How Disaggregation Enhances the Credibility of Management Earnings Forecasts," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 811-837, September.
    19. Tse-Chun Lin & Qi Liu & Bo Sun, 2019. "Contractual Managerial Incentives with Stock Price Feedback," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(7), pages 2446-2468, July.
    20. Bergstresser, Daniel & Philippon, Thomas, 2006. "CEO incentives and earnings management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 511-529, June.
    21. Stephan Hollander & Maarten Pronk & Erik Roelofsen, 2010. "Does Silence Speak? An Empirical Analysis of Disclosure Choices During Conference Calls," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 531-563, June.
    22. Jennifer Francis & Dhananjay Nanda & Per Olsson, 2008. "Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Quality, and Cost of Capital," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 53-99, March.
    23. Frankel, R & Johnson, M & Skinner, DJ, 1999. "An empirical examination of conference calls as a voluntary disclosure medium," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 133-150.
    24. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 1989. "Disclosure Decisions by Firms and the Competition for Price Efficiency," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 633-646, July.
    25. Guay, Wayne & Samuels, Delphine & Taylor, Daniel, 2016. "Guiding through the Fog: Financial statement complexity and voluntary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 234-269.
    26. Jennifer Francis & Allen H. Huang & Shivaram Rajgopal & Amy Y. Zang, 2008. "CEO Reputation and Earnings Quality," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 25(1), pages 109-147, March.
    27. Radhakrishnan Gopalan & Todd Milbourn & Fenghua Song & Anjan V. Thakor, 2014. "Duration of Executive Compensation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2777-2817, December.
    28. Srivastava, Anup, 2014. "Why have measures of earnings quality changed over time?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 196-217.
    29. Andres Almazan & Sanjay Banerji & Adolfo De Motta, 2008. "Attracting Attention: Cheap Managerial Talk and Costly Market Monitoring," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1399-1436, June.
    30. Ferreira, Daniel & Ferreira, Miguel A. & Raposo, Clara C., 2011. "Board structure and price informativeness," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 523-545, March.
    31. Lin Peng & Ailsa Röell, 2014. "Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(2), pages 487-526, April.
    32. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 678-709, August.
    33. Josef Schroth, 2018. "Managerial Compensation and Stock Price Manipulation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(5), pages 1335-1381, December.
    34. García Lara, Juan Manuel & García Osma, Beatriz & Penalva, Fernando, 2016. "Accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 221-238.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Josef Schroth, 2018. "Managerial Compensation and Stock Price Manipulation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(5), pages 1335-1381, December.
    2. Josef Schroth, 2015. "Managerial Compensation Duration and Stock Price Manipulation," Staff Working Papers 15-25, Bank of Canada.
    3. Yongtao Hong & Fariz Huseynov & Wei Zhang, 2014. "Earnings Management and Analyst Following: A Simultaneous Equations Analysis," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 43(2), pages 355-390, June.
    4. Andrew Hertzberg, 2018. "A Theory of Disclosure in Speculative Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(12), pages 5787-5806, December.
    5. Peng, Qiyuan & Yin, Sirui, 2021. "Does the executive labor market discipline? Labor market incentives and earnings management," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 62-86.
    6. Beyer, Anne & Cohen, Daniel A. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Walther, Beverly R., 2010. "The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 296-343, December.
    7. Edmans, Alex & Huang, Chong & Heinle, Mirko, 2013. "The Real Costs of Disclosure," CEPR Discussion Papers 9637, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Goldman, Eitan & Martel, Jordan & Schneemeier, Jan, 2022. "A theory of financial media," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 239-258.
    9. Blankespoor, Elizabeth & deHaan, Ed & Marinovic, Iván, 2020. "Disclosure processing costs, investors’ information choice, and equity market outcomes: A review," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2).
    10. Taylan Mavruk & Evert Carlsson, 2015. "How long is a long-term-firm investment in the presence of governance mechanisms?," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 5(1), pages 117-149, June.
    11. Xiong, Yan & Jiang, Xu, 2022. "Economic consequences of managerial compensation contract disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2).
    12. Michał Dzieliński & Alexander F. Wagner & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 2017. "Straight Talkers and Vague Talkers: The Effects of Managerial Style in Earnings Conference Calls," NBER Working Papers 23425, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Qiang Cheng & Young Jun Cho & Jae B. Kim, 2021. "Managers’ pay duration and voluntary disclosures," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(7-8), pages 1332-1367, July.
    14. Ee, Mong Shan & Hasan, Iftekhar & Huang, He, 2022. "Stock liquidity and corporate labor investment11We are grateful to the editor (Heitor Almeida) and an anynmous reviewer for detailed and significant guidance and suggestions. We thank Huu Duong, Alvin," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    15. Bazrafshan, Ebrahim & Kandelousi, Amene S. & Hooy, Chee-Wooi, 2016. "The impact of earnings management on the extent of disclosure and true financial performance: Evidence from listed firms in Hong Kong," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 206-219.
    16. Seo, Hojun, 2021. "Peer effects in corporate disclosure decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1).
    17. Haga, Jesper & Ittonen, Kim & Tronnes, Per C. & Wong, Leon, 2018. "Is earnings management sensitive to discount rates?," Journal of Accounting Literature, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 75-88.
    18. Calcagno, Riccardo & Heider, Florian, 2021. "Stock-based pay, liquidity, and the role of market making," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    19. Chi, Jianxin Daniel & Gupta, Manu & Johnson, Shane A., 2020. "Short-horizon incentives and stock price inflation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    20. Emmanuel Mamatzakis & Anna Bagntasarian, 2021. "The nexus between CEO incentives and analysts' earnings forecasts," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 6205-6248, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic models; Financial markets; Recent economic and financial developments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:20-43. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bocgvca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.