On the Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants in Decentralized Countries: The Case of Spain
AbstractThis paper studies the effect of political variables on the gains obtained by Spanish regions in periodical bargaining of the intergovernmental financing agreements and on the regional distribution of discretional earmarked grants over the period 1987-2008. First, we find that the relationship between gains in transferred revenues and on regional public debt stocks depends on the period and the specific issues discussed in the corresponding negotiation, aside from political affinity. Second, we show that the most discretional program of earmarked grants is strongly driven by electoral strategy. National incumbents tend to allocate intergovernmental transfers where there are competitive regional elections. Moreover, we show that earmarked grants are allocated in those regions where the incumbent performs better in national elections and, especially, in those where there are more seats to be won. Hence we prove that both strategies are complementary rather than exclusive.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU with number paper1230.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 19 Sep 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html
Intergovernmental grants; party systems; elections; subcentral public debt.;
Other versions of this item:
- Pablo Simon-Cosano & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Alberto Vaquero, 2014. "On the Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants in Decentralized Countries: The Case of Spain," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(1), pages 135-156, January.
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-09-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GEO-2012-09-30 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-PBE-2012-09-30 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2012-09-30 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hans Pitlik & Friedrich Schneider & Harald Strotmann, 2005.
"Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System,"
IAW Discussion Papers
19, Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (IAW).
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- Hans Pitlik & Friedrich Schneider & Harald Strotmann, 2005. "Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut fÃ¼r Volkswirtschaftslehre der UniversitÃ¤t Hohenheim 254/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
- Hans Pitlik & Friedrich Schneider & Harald Strotmann, 2005. "Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany’s Intergovernmental Transfer System," CESifo Working Paper Series 1426, CESifo Group Munich.
- Dahlberg, M. & Johansson, E., 1999.
"On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments,"
1999:24, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
- Dahlberg, Matz & Johansson, Eva, 1999. "On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments," Working Paper Series 1999:24, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Alberto Porto & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001. "Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 237-256, November.
- Johansson, Eva, 2003. "Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: empirical evidence from Swedish municipalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 883-915, May.
- Khemani, Stuti, 2003. "Partisan politics and intergovernmental transfers in India," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3016, The World Bank.
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