Public and Private Health Insurance in Germany: The Ignored Risk Selection Problem
AbstractWhile risk selection within the German public health insurance system has received considerable attention, risk selection between public and private health insurers has largely been ignored. This is surprising since – given the institutional structure – risk selection between systems is likely to be more pronounced. We find clear evidence for risk selection in favor of private insurers. While private insurers are unable to select the healthy upon enrollment they manage to dump high risk individuals who then end up in the public system. This gives private insurers an unjustified competitive advantage vis-à-vis public insurer. A risk adjusted compensation would mitigate this advantage.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 312.
Date of creation: Aug 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Universitaetsstrasse 16, D-86159 Augsburg, Germany
Phone: +49 821 598 4060
Fax: +49 821 598 4217
Web page: http://www.wiwi.uni-augsburg.de/vwl/institut
More information through EDIRC
risk selection; public and private health insurance; risk adjustment;
Other versions of this item:
- Martina Grunow & Robert Nuscheler, 2010. "Public and Private Health Insurance in Germany: The Ignored Risk Selection Problem," Working Papers 093, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
- C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2010-09-11 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2010-09-11 (Insurance Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Van de ven, Wynand P.M.M. & Ellis, Randall P., 2000. "Risk adjustment in competitive health plan markets," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 755-845 Elsevier.
- Doorslaer, Eddy van & Jones, Andrew M., 2003. "Inequalities in self-reported health: validation of a new approach to measurement," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 61-87, January.
- Kifmann, Mathias & Nell, Martin, 2013. "Fairer Systemwettbewerb zwischen gesetzlicher und privater Krankenversicherung," hche Research Papers 2013/06, Hamburg Center for Health Economics (hche), University of Hamburg.
- Bünnings, Christian & Tauchmann, Harald, 2013.
"Who opts out of the statutory health insurance? A discrete time hazard model for Germany,"
IWQW Discussion Paper Series
10/2013, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung (IWQW).
- Christian Bünnings & Harald Tauchmann, 2013. "Who Opts Out of the Statutory Health Insurance? A Discrete Time Hazard Model for Germany," Ruhr Economic Papers 0458, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dr. Albrecht Bossert).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.