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Can competition in the credit market be excessive?

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Author Info
Ramon Caminal ()
Carmen Matutes

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Abstract

We study how market power affects investment and welfare when banks choose between restricting loan sizes and monitoring, in order to alleviate an underlying moral hazard problem. The impact of market power on aggregate welfare is the result of two countervailing effects. An increase in banks' market power results in: (i) higher lending rates, which worsens the borrower's incentive problem and reduces investment by unmonitored firms, (ii) higher monitoring effort, which reduces the proportion of credit-constrained firms. Whenever the second effect dominates, it is optimal to provide banks with some degree of market power.

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Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 527.02.

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Length: 22
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2002
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Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:527.02

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Related research
Keywords: market power; monitoring; loan size rationing; moral hazard;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Besanko, David & Kanatas, George, 1993. "Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral Hazard," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 213-32. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. " The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bester,Helmut Hellwig,Martin, 1987. "Moral hazard and equilibrium credit rationing: An overview of the issues," Discussion Paper Serie A 125, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 1996. "Competition for Deposits, Fragility, and Insurance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 184-216, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. J. Miguel Villas-Boas & Udo Schmidt-Mohr, 1999. "Oligopoly with Asymmetric Information: Differentiation in Credit Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(3), pages 375-396, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bacchetta, Philippe & Caminal, Ramon, 2000. "Do capital market imperfections exacerbate output fluctuations?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 449-468, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Hoshi, Takeo & Kashyap, Anil & Scharfstein, David, 1990. "The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 67-88, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. David Besanko & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Relationship Banking, Deposit Insurance and Bank Portfolio Choice," Finance 0411046, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  9. Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 2000. "Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-34, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Allen N. Berger & David B. Humphrey, 1994. "Bank scale economies, mergers, concentration, and efficiency: the U.S. experience," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 94-23, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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  11. Thakor, Anjan V., 2000. "Relationship Banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 3-5, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Vesa Kanniainen & Rune Stenbacka, 1997. "Project Monitoring and Banking Competition under Adverse Selection," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-23, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Oct 1998. [Downloadable!]
  13. Michael H. Riordan, 1992. "Competition and Bank Performance: A Theoretical Perspective," Papers 0026, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  14. Allen N. Berger & Timothy H. Hannan, 1993. "Using efficiency measures to distinguish among alternative explanations of the structure-performance relationship in banking," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 93-18, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  15. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1995. "The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(2), pages 407-43, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Vesa Kanniainen & Rune Stenbacka, 1997. "Project Monitoring and Banking Competition under Adverse Selection," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-23, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Oct 1998. [Downloadable!]
  2. Reint Gropp & Sandrine Corvoisier, 2001. "Bank concentration and retail interest rates," Working Paper Series 072, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Pekka Mannonen, 2002. "The Strategic Response of Banks to an Exogenous Positive Information Shock in the Credit Markets," Discussion Papers 830, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  4. Luz Adriana Flórez & Carlos Esteban Posda & José Fernando Escobar, . "El crédito y sus factores determinantes: el caso colombiano (1990 -2004)," Borradores de Economia 311, Banco de la Republica de Colombia. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Pekka Mannonen, 2001. "Advancing information technology and financial intermediation," Discussion Papers 770, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  6. Mitchell Berlin & Alexander Butler, 2002. "Collateral and competition," Working Papers 02-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  7. Alan D. Morrison, 2000. "Regulator Reputation and Optimal Banking Competition Policy," OFRC Working Papers Series 2000fe07, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  8. Fiona, Tregenna, 2006. "An empirical investigation of the effects of concentration on profitability among US banks," MPRA Paper 13731, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2009. [Downloadable!]
  9. Luz Adriana Flórez & Carlos Esteban Posada & José Fernando Escobar, 2005. "Crédito Y Depósitos Bancariosen Colombia (1990-2004): Una Relación De Largo Plaz," ENSAYOS SOBRE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA - ESPE. [Downloadable!]
  10. Félix J. López Iturriaga, 2005. "Debt ownership structure and legal system: an international analysis," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 37(3), pages 355-365, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ramon Caminal, 2002. "Taxation of banks: A theoretical framework," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 525.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  12. Ralf Elsas & Jan Pieter Krahnen, 2003. "Universal Banks and Relationships with Firms," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/20, Center for Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]
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