This paper is concerned with the interactions between the structure of the banking sector and the product market. We consider a framework where firms' installation costs are financed by means of industrial loans from specialized banks. Initially, we assume that an exogenous number of banks compete in providing loans before the firms compete in prices in a market with product differentiation. We show that even a small decrease in the number of banks can cause a dramatic fall in competition among firms.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number
396.97.
Find related papers by JEL classification: G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)