Repeated Bargaining with Persistent Private Information
AbstractThe paper analyzes repeated contract negotiations involving the same buyer and seller where the contracts are linked because the buyer has persistent (but not fully permanent) private information. (The main application is labor contracts, where the employer has private information about the value of labor services sold by the union). The size of the surplus being divided is specified as a two-state Markov chain with transitions that are synchronized with contract negotiation dates. Equilibrium involves information cycles triggered by the success or failure of aggressive demands made by the seller. The main result characterizes a class of cyclic weak-Markov-Perfect equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 9708.
Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.
INFORMATION ; CONTRACTS;
Other versions of this item:
- Kennan, John, 2001. "Repeated Bargaining with Persistent Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(4), pages 719-55, October.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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