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Dynamic Pricing with Limited Commitment

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  • Martino Banchio
  • Frank Yang

Abstract

A monopolist wants to sell one item per period to a consumer with evolving and persistent private information. The seller sets a price each period depending on the history so far, but cannot commit to future prices. We show that, regardless of the degree of persistence, any equilibrium under a D1-style refinement gives the seller revenue no higher than what she would get from posting all prices in advance.

Suggested Citation

  • Martino Banchio & Frank Yang, 2021. "Dynamic Pricing with Limited Commitment," Papers 2102.07742, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2102.07742
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    References listed on IDEAS

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