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Multilateral matching with scale economies

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  • Chao Huang

Abstract

This paper studies multilateral matching in which any set of agents can negotiate contracts. We assume scale economies in the sense that an agent substitutes some contracts with some new contracts only if the newly signed contracts involve a weakly larger set of partners. We show that a weakly setwise stable outcome exists in a market with scale economies and a setwise stable outcome exists under a stronger scale economies condition. Our conditions apply to environments in which more partners bring advantages, and allow agents to bargain over contracts signed by them.

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  • Chao Huang, 2023. "Multilateral matching with scale economies," Papers 2310.19479, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2310.19479
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    References listed on IDEAS

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