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Revealed preferences for dynamically inconsistent models

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  • Federico Echenique
  • Gerelt Tserenjigmid

Abstract

We study the testable implications of models of dynamically inconsistent choices when planned choices are unobservable, and thus only "on path" data is available. First, we discuss the approach in Blow, Browning and Crawford (2021), who characterize first-order rationalizability of the model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We show that the first-order approach does not guarantee rationalizability by means of the quasi-hyperbolic model. This motivates consideration of an abstract model of intertemporal choice, under which we provide a characterization of different behavioral models -- including the naive and sophisticated paradigms of dynamically inconsistent choice.

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  • Federico Echenique & Gerelt Tserenjigmid, 2023. "Revealed preferences for dynamically inconsistent models," Papers 2305.14125, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2305.14125
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Federico Echenique & Taisuke Imai & Kota Saito, 2020. "Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice: Exponential Discounting and Its Generalizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 114-143, November.
    7. Walter Bossert & Yves Sprumont, 2013. "Every Choice Function Is Backwards‐Induction Rationalizable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2521-2534, November.
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