IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2209.04892.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

"Calibeating": Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game

Author

Listed:
  • Dean P. Foster
  • Sergiu Hart

Abstract

In order to identify expertise, forecasters should not be tested by their calibration score, which can always be made arbitrarily small, but rather by their Brier score. The Brier score is the sum of the calibration score and the refinement score; the latter measures how good the sorting into bins with the same forecast is, and thus attests to "expertise." This raises the question of whether one can gain calibration without losing expertise, which we refer to as "calibeating." We provide an easy way to calibeat any forecast, by a deterministic online procedure. We moreover show that calibeating can be achieved by a stochastic procedure that is itself calibrated, and then extend the results to simultaneously calibeating multiple procedures, and to deterministic procedures that are continuously calibrated.

Suggested Citation

  • Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2022. ""Calibeating": Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game," Papers 2209.04892, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2209.04892
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2209.04892
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Foster, Dean & Hart, Sergiu, 2023. ""Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
    2. Foster, Dean P. & Hart, Sergiu, 2018. "Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 271-293.
    3. Foster, Dean P., 1999. "A Proof of Calibration via Blackwell's Approachability Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 73-78, October.
    4. Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2021. "Forecast Hedging and Calibration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(12), pages 3447-3490.
    5. Alvaro Sandroni, 2003. "The reproducible properties of correct forecasts," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 151-159, December.
    6. ,, 2008. "Many inspections are manipulable," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(3), September.
    7. Hart, Sergiu, 1992. "Games in extensive and strategic forms," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 19-40, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Foster, Dean & Hart, Sergiu, 2023. ""Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Varun Gupta & Christopher Jung & Georgy Noarov & Mallesh M. Pai & Aaron Roth, 2021. "Online Multivalid Learning: Means, Moments, and Prediction Intervals," Papers 2101.01739, arXiv.org.
    2. Dean Foster & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Calibration: Respice, Adspice, Prospice," Discussion Papers 1537, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2015. "Calibration and Expert Testing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    4. Colin, Stewart, 2011. "Nonmanipulable Bayesian testing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2029-2041, September.
    5. Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Sandroni, Alvaro & Smorodinsky, Rann & Weinstein, Jonathan, 2010. "Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2203-2217, November.
    6. David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer, 2015. "On the Failures of Bonus Plans," Papers 1505.04587, arXiv.org.
    7. Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2021. "Forecast Hedging and Calibration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(12), pages 3447-3490.
    8. Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2006. "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests," Discussion Papers 1425, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Yossi Feinberg & Nicolas Lambert, 2015. "Mostly calibrated," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 153-163, February.
    10. Kavaler, Itay & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2019. "On comparison of experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 94-109.
    11. Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2008. "Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1437-1466, November.
    12. David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer, 2021. "Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 483-504, March.
    13. Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2009. "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 34(1), pages 57-70, February.
    14. , & ,, 2013. "Expressible inspections," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    15. Arieli, Itai & Levy, Yehuda John, 2015. "Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 166-185.
    16. János Flesch & Jeroen Kuipers & Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi & Gijs Schoenmakers & Eilon Solan & Koos Vrieze, 2010. "Perfect-Information Games with Lower-Semicontinuous Payoffs," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 35(4), pages 742-755, November.
    17. Schorfheide, Frank & Wolpin, Kenneth I., 2016. "To hold out or not to hold out," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 332-345.
    18. Eddie Dekel & Yossi Feinberg, 2006. "Non-Bayesian Testing of a Stochastic Prediction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(4), pages 893-906.
    19. Venkat Anantharam, 2022. "Weakening the grip of the model," Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 100(3), pages 385-387, April.
    20. Prakash Shenoy, 1998. "Game Trees For Decision Analysis," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 149-171, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2209.04892. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.