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Algorithmic Fairness and Statistical Discrimination

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  • John W. Patty
  • Elizabeth Maggie Penn

Abstract

Algorithmic fairness is a new interdisciplinary field of study focused on how to measure whether a process, or algorithm, may unintentionally produce unfair outcomes, as well as whether or how the potential unfairness of such processes can be mitigated. Statistical discrimination describes a set of informational issues that can induce rational (i.e., Bayesian) decision-making to lead to unfair outcomes even in the absence of discriminatory intent. In this article, we provide overviews of these two related literatures and draw connections between them. The comparison illustrates both the conflict between rationality and fairness and the importance of endogeneity (e.g., "rational expectations" and "self-fulfilling prophecies") in defining and pursuing fairness. Taken in concert, we argue that the two traditions suggest a value for considering new fairness notions that explicitly account for how the individual characteristics an algorithm intends to measure may change in response to the algorithm.

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  • John W. Patty & Elizabeth Maggie Penn, 2022. "Algorithmic Fairness and Statistical Discrimination," Papers 2208.08341, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2208.08341
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kevin Lang & Ariella Kahn-Lang Spitzer, 2020. "Race Discrimination: An Economic Perspective," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 68-89, Spring.
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    3. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-157, Jan.-Feb..
    4. Becker, Gary S., 1971. "The Economics of Discrimination," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 2, number 9780226041162, September.
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    7. Lundberg, Shelly J & Startz, Richard, 1983. "Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 340-347, June.
    8. Jon Kleinberg & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2019. "Simplicity Creates Inequity: Implications for Fairness, Stereotypes, and Interpretability," NBER Working Papers 25854, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    11. Elizabeth Maggie Penn & John W. Patty & Sean Gailmard, 2011. "Manipulation and Single‐Peakedness: A General Result," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(2), pages 436-449, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mallory Avery & Andreas Leibbrandt & Joseph Vecci, 2023. "Does Artificial Intelligence Help or Hurt Gender Diversity? Evidence from Two Field Experiments on Recruitment in Tech," Monash Economics Working Papers 2023-09, Monash University, Department of Economics.

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