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The Role of Money in the Business Cycle

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  • Zhao Jianglin

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to reemphasize the money theory of exchange which is centered on the function of exchange medium of money, and make a contribution towards linearization of the quantity equation of exchange. A dynamical quantity equation is presented and an important balanced path of economic evolution is derived. To understand the business cycle we propose a hypothesis of natural cycle and driving cycle concerning the evolution of the balanced path and plentiful conclusions can be made.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhao Jianglin, 2017. "The Role of Money in the Business Cycle," Papers 1707.00947, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2020.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1707.00947
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