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Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd"

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  • Kremer, Ilan
  • Mansour, Yishay
  • Perry, Motty

Abstract

We study a novel mechanism design model in which agents each arrive sequentially and choose one action from a set of actions with unknown rewards. The information revealed by the principal a¤ects the incentives of the agents to explore and generate new information. We characterize the optimal disclosure policy of a planner whose goal is to maximize social welfare. One interpretation of our result is the implementation of what is known as the "wisdom of the crowd". This topic has become increasingly relevant with the rapid spread of the Internet over the past decade.

Suggested Citation

  • Kremer, Ilan & Mansour, Yishay & Perry, Motty, 2013. "Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd"," Economic Research Papers 270435, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:270435
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.270435
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Simina Br^anzei & Yuval Peres, 2019. "Multiplayer Bandit Learning, from Competition to Cooperation," Papers 1908.01135, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
    2. Meena Jagadeesan & Michael I. Jordan & Nika Haghtalab, 2022. "Competition, Alignment, and Equilibria in Digital Marketplaces," Papers 2208.14423, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.

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