The GATT Negotiations and US/EC Agricultural Policies Solutions to Noncooperative Games
AbstractCountries cooperate in negotiating treaties. However, treaty compliance is noncooperative; signatories comply with treaties only if compliance leaves them better off than noncompliance. US and EC agricultural policies of 1986 are modeled through a noncooperative game. Bilateral treaties, formalizations of Nash Equilibria, are presented which improve US and EC welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center in its series Bulletins with number 7491.
Date of creation: 1989
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Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mahe, Louis Pascal & Tavera, Christophe, 1988.
"Bilateral Harmonization of EC and U.S. Agricultural Policies,"
7457, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Mahe, L P & Tavera, C, 1988. "Bilateral Harmonization of EC and U.S. Agricultural Policies," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 15(4), pages 327-48.
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