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Loss Aversion and Reference Points in Contracts

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Author Info
Just, D.R.
Wu, Steve

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Abstract

Loss aversion has become the dominant alternative to expected utility theory for modeling choice under uncertainty. The setting of the base payment in contracts provides an interesting application of referenced based decision theory. The impact of loss aversion on contract structure depends critically on whether reservation opportunities (outside options) are evaluated with respect to the reference point implied in the contract. We show that when reservation opportunities are independent of the reference point, reward contracts are optimal. However, when reservation opportunities are evaluated against the reference point, then penalty contracts are more efficient.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by SCC-76: Economics and Management of Risk in Agriculture and Natural Resources in its series SCC-76 Meeting, March 31-April 2, 2005, Myrtle Beach, SC with number 28727.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ags:sccfmb:28727

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Web page: http://www.auburn.edu/academic/agriculture/agrisk
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Related research
Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty; L14; D81; D21; D82;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hueth, Brent & Ligon, Ethan, 2003. "On the Efficacy of Contractual Provisions for Processing Tomatoes," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 21990, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  2. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hueth, Brent & Ligon, Ethan, 2003. "Estimation of an Efficient Tomato Contract," Staff General Research Papers 10235, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.

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